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in my view

DOUBLE LIVES

Sir:
I read the article by Captain Light entitled “The Navy’s Moral Compass” [Naval
War College Review, Summer 2012] with great interest. The Navy has tied personal conduct to the careers of commanding officers as a matter of public concern. I am writing to provide some insight into how the behaviour of “immoral
and dissolute” commanding officers has a troubling ripple effect into the civilian
world the Navy is charged to protect and not plunder.
Recently, I was formally engaged to a commanding officer as part of a three
year relationship that included his entire command at sea. I relocated to Guam
because he repeatedly asked me to, against my objections. He told me he had
orders to go there after his command. A few days after I arrived on island to
begin my new job and on the night before his Change of Command ceremony,
he e-mailed me that he was in love with someone else and cut off all contact. He,
of course, did not ever go to Guam. I later discovered that he was deceiving yet
another woman, who lived elsewhere, during the same three years. He was also
planning to marry her after his command ended until, in her words, “he pulled
a cowardly breakup.” One may try to dismiss this because a sailor has “a girl in
every port” but who can actually respect a commanding officer who shanghaied
the girl and sent her to a remote port while he stayed ashore for a desk job?
I was badly shattered and very confused. Nonetheless, I understood that a man
entrusted with national security matters had not suffered from a momentary
lapse of judgement or a minor lapse in character and courage. He had led a fundamentally dishonest and secretive life every day for at least three years. I quickly
informed his chain of command and the DOD Inspector General about his tawdry behavior. I received only one response. “In your now mixed experience with
the Navy, I want to assure you that your efforts on behalf of the crew and families
of BOATNAME are much appreciated. I’m grateful for your contribution.”
I had interrupted my twenty year career as a research scientist to find myself
abruptly isolated, thousands of miles from anyone I had ever known, and without
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013

6232_InMyView.indd 133

1

2/26/13 12:06 PM

1 3 4 	naval war college re v ie w

Naval War College Review, Vol. 66 [2013], No. 2, Art. 19

any of my possessions only because a commanding officer in the U.S. Navy was
so cowardly that it strains credulity. The least of my concerns was appreciation
for my efforts on behalf of some people I had only casually known because they
were also associated with a boat.
Recently, I found that he is back in a leadership position. After concerns were
again expressed to the Navy and, after a few questions from them, they responded, “There is no current evidence to question the fitness or ability of —— . . .”
After ignoring this, the word “current” was a nice touch.
First, the proportion of commanding officers with questionable conduct is
small but is probably higher than 3%. There is no reason to believe that I am the
only civilian who has raised concerns that the Navy decided not to address.
To my surprise, his actions had grave consequences for my personal security.
I suspect other civilians have faced this but also suspect that this particular issue
is rarely acknowledged in your community. Because the Navy was not willing to
question the veracity of its senior officer, no civilian system would either. The
most inconsequential of the personal problems I faced was that I was not able to
recover some of my belongings (that he had stored in his name before my move)
because there was no way to find out why they went missing. He did not acknowledge my requests for assistance. The police and courts were unwilling to believe
that the possessions were mine if he, an officer, would not assist.
One reason that personal conduct is a matter of public concern is because
unstable personal situations, in any sailor’s life, can lead to distractions that could
become harmful to the entire command, especially one confined at sea. Commanding officers are expected to serve as a role model. Although he kept his
“double/triple” life hidden from the women whom he placed at risk, he led them
in view of his wardroom and crew.
A commanding officer at sea has little scrutiny and so there are few restraints
placed upon his behavior other than his conscience. Sailors who report to him
and form the allegiances that arise from time at sea cannot be expected to be the
only source of information regarding his conduct.
My former fiancé repeatedly described to me how he screened all e-mails to
the boat for specific situations that might create distractions for a sailor and,
consequently, the command. Those situations included monitoring potentially
explosive relationship issues such as multiple relationships. If a sailor’s unstable
life could lead to distracting drama that is harmful for the command, then the
CO’s does as well. An obvious suggestion is for his sailormail to also be screened
by a superior officer. This would quickly eliminate any issue that sets a poor example or has the potential to distract the command.
Clearly, the Navy has long argued that honorable personal conduct is an essential quality in a commanding officer. I do not have the expertise to know
what qualities go into being an excellent commanding officer but the subject
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss2/19
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is a matter of public concern and deserves a thoughtful, honest and consistent
statement from the Navy. Like any well-educated citizen, I have read classics that
explore this topic (e.g., the Stoics or Sun Tzu). There is a solid argument that a
fine warrior is not purely a paragon of virtue because other qualities are essential.
For lack of a better word, the “sinister” could be exactly what is required. My
understanding of my former fiancé suggests that a “yin/yang” dynamic is inked
into his nature. I acknowledge that he is likely quite good at commanding a boat
even if I do not think much of him as a man.
Requiring PCOs to sign an agreement that they will avoid “immoral and dissolute behavior” is very odd to the public when many of us just call that “being
an adult” and, for those of you in the military, the UCMJ already has the “conduct
unbecoming . . .” clause. Something is amiss if the normal rules are not enough to
rein in these few senior officers in the Navy.
Furthermore, in the civilian world, someone who behaved this way on a daily
basis over years would have been quickly flagged for numerous security clearance violations. Simply speaking, dishonesty is unacceptable and “double lives”
involving sex are all the more so because they trigger additional lies born out of
cowardice and shame. These lead to the potential for duress. If the Navy cannot
take these issues seriously with its line officers in command, why would anyone
else take them seriously? Yet, we cannot all count on having our indiscretions
ignored until they are no longer “current.”
Finally, the claim that COs are models of virtue is a potential risk to the Navy’s
reputation because it places private citizens in jeopardy. Hypothetically speaking,
claims of moral superiority are the perfect cloak to veil a predator. If the prey
complains, those same claims can be used to give the predator safe harbor. This
is clearly not an adequate defense of the citizenry but instead it is one from which
a private individual needs protection.
I will close with a final suggestion. Because the Navy has repeatedly announced that it is concerned about the behavior of some of its COs, it would be
helpful for the Navy to provide practical guidance to citizens on how concerns
should be broached. This should include assurance that concerns are considered
in an impartial way free of the Navy’s understandably biased interest in protecting
the individual senior officer and its own reputation. Such bias brings a significant
cost to a civilian who, while acting out of her own desire to protect the public
good, faces the intimidating command structure of the U.S. Navy after she has
been badly weakened by one of its officers.

dr. elise a. ralph
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FUCHIDA’s WHOPPERS

Sir:
Mr. Bennett has produced here in the Naval War College Review [“Parshall’s
‘Whoppers’ Examined: Fact-Checking the Various Claims and Conclusions of
Jonathan Parshall,” Winter 2013] essentially a Reader’s Digest version of a very long
blog entry he posted in March 2012. He then quietly removed it for “updating” after receiving an equally lengthy point-by-point rebuttal from me. Intriguingly, Mr.
Bennett has incorporated none of that feedback into this article. I won’t bore the
reader trying to reproduce the details of my rebuttal here. Those with a masochistic bent can view it here: http://www.combinedfleet.com/BennettRebuttal.htm.
However, a quick summarization and rebuttal of the underlying themes of Mr.
Bennett’s arguments is easily presented. He has produced an impressively cited article that will seem superficially plausible to a casual reader. However, his scholarship on these matters is equally superficial and does not withstand serious scrutiny.
Regarding Pearl Harbor, Mr. Bennett’s basic argument is that it was not
Fuchida who originated the myth surrounding a hypothetical attack against
Pearl Harbor’s fuel tanks. However, a careful review of Fuchida’s statements (see
“masochistic bent,” above) given in several interviews from 1945 to 1963 reveals
a different picture. Fuchida’s account changed dramatically over that time, and by
the end he was relating to Gordon Prange the “classic” myth regarding a followup attack aimed at these facilities. His myth persists to this day.
Regarding the Battle of Midway, Mr. Bennett attempts to chip away at Anthony
Tully’s and my account of what occurred on the Japanese flight decks immediately prior to the fateful 1020 dive-bomber attack. His general line of attack is
to try splitting mathematical hairs without any positive data to back him up. A
symbolic refutation of Mr. Bennett’s computational methods is thusly:
(Wrong) – (Wrong) ≠ (Right).
In the course of this exercise, he overstates his case so badly that he has no
choice but to cast aspersions on the credibility of various Japanese sources, including both the Japanese official war history series (Senshi Sōsho) and the air
unit records (known as kōdōchōshos) of the Japanese carriers themselves.
His attack on these sources is more serious, because of what it represents to the
study of history. In essence, Mr. Bennett is saying that operational records must
take a backseat to personal accounts. This is folly. And frankly, it is a folly born of
his incomprehension and inability to use the sources he criticizes.
Consider the following example, wherein a hypothetical modern historian
produces a book on the Battle of Midway. Based on Japanese aviator accounts,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss2/19

6232_InMyView.indd 136

4

2/26/13 11:18 AM

	in m y v ie w

Ralph et al.: In My View

137

this author might claim that eyewitness accounts “proved” that the Japanese
struck the carrier Yorktown with five bombs during the battle. However, in the
face of such “eyewitness evidence,” more prudent naval historians would be well
within their rights to say, “Wait a minute! We have the Yorktown’s after-action
report, which describes precisely where each of the three bombs hit her. She’s an
American ship, and they ought to know!” This same principle applies exactly in
reverse to the Japanese unit records and what they have to say about what occurred on board the Japanese carriers at Midway. Any sensible modern historian
would use Japanese operational records as the bedrock of his/her account and
then flesh out the narrative with personal recollections. This is precisely what
Tully and I did in Shattered Sword.
Mr. Bennett should think very carefully before attacking our methods and
source selection. By so doing, he attacks not only us but also such experts as John
Lundstrom, Osamu Tagaya, Henry Sakaida, J. Michael Wenger, James Sawruk,
and other members of the research community surrounding the Pacific War,
whose collective wisdom on these matters vastly outweighs Mr. Bennett’s. Indeed,
Lundstrom, Tagaya, and Sawruk personally reviewed our original manuscript
and vetted its approach and conclusions. Mr. Bennett’s credibility in questioning
Senshi Sōsho and the kōdōchōshos is precisely nil. In essence, Mr. Bennett is saying, “Stop the historical train: I want to go back to the 1980s and just use Grandpa’s sources!” Fortunately for the study of history, this isn’t going to happen.
Regarding Mr. Bennett’s defense of Fuchida’s claim of having been on board
USS Missouri for the Japanese surrender ceremony, I need simply point out
that no one has ever produced a corroborating account placing Fuchida at this
event. The only “evidence” we have comes from Fuchida himself. Extraordinary
claims require positive proof. Yet Mr. Bennett presses his case by demanding
that historians prove a negative. That’s not cricket. Likewise, the photograph Mr.
Bennett puts forth purporting to show Fuchida on board Missouri was analyzed
by the curator of the Battleship Missouri Memorial and shown to be that of an
American sailor.
In closing, it is perhaps not surprising that Mr. Bennett’s relentless attacks on
my scholarship and intellectual honesty have not resulted in my taking a more
sanguine view of Fuchida’s misstatements. This is compounded by Mr. Bennett’s failure to incorporate any of my previous criticisms of his work into this
Naval War College Review article. Though I previously had no interest in pursuing these matters further, during the course of refuting his original blog post I
took the time to examine several more of Fuchida’s wartime accounts. As part
of this rebuttal I am presenting three more Fuchida whoppers for readers interested in such matters. They can be found here: http://www.combinedfleet.com/
ThreeMoreWhoppers.htm.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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All are short. Each comes with annotated Japanese sources presenting the data
in a form that will be easily comprehensible to anyone. And one of them is a real
howler. They demonstrate yet again—if any further proof was possibly needed—
that Fuchida is not a reliable witness to the history of the Pacific War. If Fuchida
is to be used at all, he absolutely must be used in conjunction with other, corroborating sources. I have no doubt that Mr. Bennett will never willingly accept
that the central subject of his screenplay was clearly a man who was overly fond of
spinning very tall tales. But any objective historian cannot help but be convinced
by the evidence the Japanese sources provide us on these matters.

jonathan parshall

WORLD’S FIRST “CARRIER KILLER” BALLISTIC MISSILE

Sir:
The excellent article on Aegis ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) development by
Messrs. Hicks, Galdorisi, and Truver provides the official U.S. intelligence community conclusion that China has developed the world’s first “carrier killer” ballistic missile (Summer 2012 edition of the Naval War College Review, page 69).
While U.S. officials have long believed that the earlier Soviet anti-carrier ballistic missile never became operational, several Russian sources now confirm that
this feat was accomplished under the Soviet regime. In 1962 the Soviet government approved the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
for use against surface ships, especially U.S. aircraft carriers that threatened nuclear
strikes against the USSR.
At the time the advanced R-27/SS-N-6 SLBM was under development in
Makeyev’s SKB-385 bureau. The decision was made to provide the nuclear missile with a terminal guidance for the anti-ship role, to be redesignated R‑27K. The
R-27 and R-27K missiles were identical in their size and external appearance. (The
NATO designation was SS-NX-13; U.S. intelligence analysts initially used the designation KY-9, the prefix KY indicating the Kapustin Yar test facility.)
The missile system and trials submarine K-102 were accepted for operational
service on 15 August 1975. The complexity of the weapons system (D-5) had led
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss2/19
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to delays, with the K-102 joining the fleet more than 13 years after the project
was approved.
The R-27K/SS-NX-13 was targeted prior to launch with data provided from
aircraft or satellites tracking U.S. and British aircraft carriers and other surface
ships. Western intelligence credited the missile with a range of 350 to 400 nautical
miles and a homing warhead that had a terminal maneuvering warhead to strike
targets within a “footprint” of about 27 n.miles. Warheads of 500 kilotons to one
megaton could be fitted. The weapons system—capable of striking land or sea
targets—was to be fitted in the later Project 667A/Yankee SSBNs.
However, the R-27K missile did not become operational, because the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements of the 1970s would count every
SLBM tube as a strategic missile regardless of whether it held a land-attack or
anti-ship (tactical) missile. Some Western analysts also postulated that the missile also might be employed as an anti-submarine weapon. This evaluation fit
with the U.S. shift of sea-based strategic strike forces from carrier-based aircraft
to missile-armed submarines, and the related shift in the Soviet Navy’s emphasis
from anti-carrier warfare to anti-submarine warfare in the 1960s. Sergei Kovalev,
the dean of Russian SSBN designers, told this writer that “ASW calculations for
the R-27K were made.”

norman polmar

Coauthor with K. J. Moore of Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines (2004)

Brass and Academics

Sir:
Just wanted to pass along my thoughts of Thomas Nichols’s book review of
Howard Wiarda’s Military Brass vs. Civilian Academics at the National War College: A Clash of Cultures, in the Autumn 2012 Naval War College Review.
While I’ll say the review was good enough for me to conclude not to read
Wiarda’s book, this was not the reviewer’s intent. Nichols begins by describing
Military Brass as “amassed anecdotes that point to dire flaws in the way military
education is conducted in the United States.”
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2013
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Dire flaws? Can the review at least provide one example of a negative outcome
derived from these flaws? Whether in academia or not, who accepts one-sided anecdotes as fact? Perhaps there are kernels of truth to Wiarda’s stories but Nichols rightfully grants that such author-only perspective lacks corroboration. So I ask, what
constructive value or inherent merit lay here beyond entertainment derived from
“salty” sea stories? Does the reviewer seriously advocate that schools be restructured
based on the ruminations of a peeved professor? Nichols concedes the point but
then ignores it with “too many legitimate points will be too quickly dismissed” and
later concludes the book is “an important step in illuminating serious and continuing problems in the PME [professional military education] community.”
Now, this book may be 100 percent accurate in identifying important issues
that require to be addressed but . . . How can Nichols expect us to trust Wiarda’s
veracity when his view is presented, in my opinion, as whiny diatribe from an
annoyed academic by a reviewer who blindly accepts the teller’s tale of gross
injustice and dictatorial “brass” buffoonery at academic military establishments?
Sounds like we’ve got here a disgruntled academic reviewing the work of a
like-minded disgruntled academic. In light of this, it’s hard to accept Nichols as
an impartial reviewer; he seems to share the same bias about the military brass
and thus assumes the book will be useful in identifying areas for reform and improving the civilian academic’s experience with the pesky military ogres.
Again, an example of a real-world military-education travesty would perhaps
lend some credence, but none is offered. So by the end of the review I find myself
asking, If the military “brass” is so bad, why is there no mass exodus of civilians
from the war colleges? Have they all been thrown in the brig to prevent escape?
The serious underlying issue that Nichols ignores is Big Academia, not military academia. A national university system in crisis, where adhering to vast and
arcane government regulations to ensure immense revenue sources requires student happiness trump educational quality. This is a national “disease,” with likely
no remedy in sight until the college “bubble” bursts. That Nichols doesn’t offer
this perspective and strictly focuses on the “obvious” negativity of the war college
professorial experience leads me to conclude he should not have been chosen for
this review. And also for me to recommend the Naval War College keep this man
happy or perhaps one day you’ll experience a fusillade of anecdotes, a biographical broadside, or diatribe-filled memoir shot across your bow.

robert j. lipsitz

Captain, Medical Corps, U.S. Navy
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
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Professor Nichols replies:
Robert Lipsitz is quite angry with Howard Wiarda’s book—which he admits he
hasn’t read—and is none too pleased, either, that I agreed with much of it (although I was quite critical of the way Wiarda wrote it). Unfortunately, Captain
Lipsitz’s letter is a perfect example of the military disdain for civilian academics
that Wiarda was describing in his book.
Indeed, Captain Lipsitz’s vitriol serves only to confirm the points Wiarda
and many others in PME have made about the difficulty of reforming military
education. Any criticism of the system, and especially any that touches on the
attitudes of military officers, immediately generates an urge to “shoot the messenger,” followed by the inevitable dismissal of civilian professors as ingrates who
just don’t get it, who should either love PME or leave it, and who—at least in my
case, according to Captain Lipsitz—should be disqualified from writing about, or
reviewing, anything about military education.
More to the point, Captain Lipsitz seems to think Wiarda is just a single academic with a grudge, but he should have read my review more carefully. I emphasized at the outset that almost any civilian academic working in PME—and
I speak from over two decades of association with military education—could
verify Wiarda’s experiences. But Captain Lipsitz doesn’t have to take my word
for it: if he would like concrete examples of the kinds of flaws in the military
educational system raised by me and Wiarda, he might consider reading not only
Wiarda’s book but the numerous writings of other PME scholars—educators
whom I named in the review—such as Joan Johnson-Freese, Judith Stiehm,
George Reed, Diane Mazur, and others.
At the very least, Captain Lipsitz should refrain from impugning the personal
motives either of the author or the reviewer, since the clear goal of such ad hominem attacks is to shut down discussion and debate. Not only does this inhibit
innovation and improvement, but it is exactly contrary to the spirit we should
expect in the senior war colleges of a healthy democracy.

tom nichols

Professor, Department of National Security Affairs
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